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Abstract
Objective—Fuzzy-trace theory is a dual-process model of memory, reasoning, judgment, and 
decision making that contrasts with traditional expectancy-value approaches. We review the 
literature applying fuzzy-trace theory to health with three aims: evaluating whether the theory’s 
basic distinctions have been validated empirically in the domain of health; determining whether 
these distinctions are useful in assessing, explaining, and predicting health-related psychological 
processes; and determining whether the theory can be used to improve health judgments, 
decisions, or behaviors, especially in comparison to other approaches.
Methods—We conducted a literature review using PubMed, PsycInfo, and Web of Science to 
identify empirical peer-reviewed papers that applied fuzzy-trace theory, or central constructs of the 
theory, to investigate health judgments, decisions, or behaviors.
Results—79 studies were identified, over half published since 2012, spanning a wide variety of 
conditions and populations. Study findings supported the prediction that verbatim and gist 
representations are distinct constructs that can be retrieved independently using different cues. 
Although gist-based reasoning was usually associated with improved judgment and decision 
making, four sources of bias that can impair gist reasoning were identified. Finally, promising 
findings were reported from intervention studies that used fuzzy-trace theory to improve decision 
making and decrease unhealthy risk taking.
Conclusions—Despite large gaps in the literature, most studies supported all three aims. By 
focusing on basic psychological processes that underlie judgment and decision making, fuzzy-
trace theory provides insights into how individuals make decisions involving health risks and 
suggests innovative intervention approaches to improve health outcomes.
Keywords
fuzzy-trace theory; health behaviors; decision making; risk-taking; behavior change
Address correspondence to Susan J. Blalock, Division of Pharmaceutical Outcomes and Policy, Eshelman School of Pharmacy, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7573, USA. Phone: 1-919-962-0080. s_blalock@unc.edu. 
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Health Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 August 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Health Psychol. 2016 August ; 35(8): 781–792. doi:10.1037/hea0000384.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) is a comprehensive, dual-process model of memory, reasoning, 
judgment, and decision making that has been used to study how individuals across the life 
span make decisions that involve risk (Reyna, 2004, 2008, 2012). It explains and predicts 
variation in (1) recognition and recall of past experiences; (2) judgments and decisions, 
especially those that involve risk; and (3) behaviors that people perform in specific situations 
by explicating the cognitive mechanisms that translate thought into action. The aims of this 
paper are to: (1) evaluate whether the theory’s basic distinctions have been validated 
empirically in the domain of health; (2) determine whether these distinctions are useful in 
assessing, explaining, and predicting health-related psychological processes; and (3) 
determine whether the theory can be used to improve health judgments, decisions, or 
behaviors, especially in comparison to other approaches. We begin by describing FTT’s 
basic distinctions and articulating five key predictions derived from the theory. We then 
report the results of a literature review assessing whether these predictions have been 
supported by empirical research in the health domain.
Overview of Fuzzy-Trace Theory
FTT posits that, when an individual is exposed to any meaningful stimulus (e.g., a graph 
describing treatment risks), two types of representations of the stimulus are encoded in 
memory, a verbatim representation and one or more gist representations. Verbatim 
representations capture the exact words, numbers, or images included in the stimulus, 
whereas gist representations capture the essential, bottom-line meaning of the stimulus to the 
person, including its emotional meaning. These representations are initially encoded, 
roughly in parallel, into working memory (e.g., as a patient hears and thinks about the 
information provided) and ultimately transferred to long-term memory, although verbatim 
representations generally become rapidly inaccessible.
Evidence from many experiments on memory supports the FTT hypothesis that people 
generally encode multiple representations of a single stimulus varying in level of specificity 
(e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). In particular, people encode both categorical and (more 
precise) ordinal gist representations of quantities. For example, told that there is a 2% risk of 
stroke associated with a particular type of surgery, a person might simultaneously encode the 
gist that: (1) the surgery has some risk of causing a stroke and (2) the risk of surgery causing 
a stroke is low. The first example illustrates a categorical gist representation (i.e., some 
versus no risk), whereas the second example illustrates an ordinal gist representation (i.e., 
low versus high risk). Further, although different gist representations may be consistent with 
the information provided in a given situation (e.g., some people may consider the 2% risk 
described above as high rather than low), individuals can also fail to understand the 
information – leading to the formation of inaccurate gist representations. For example, if the 
individual described above did not understand that the surgery could cause a stroke and 
formed the gist representation that there was no risk of stroke during surgery, this gist 
representation would be inaccurate in a fundamental way— patients who think surgery has 
no risks are not able to give truly informed consent because they do not understand that they 
are accepting a risk (Reyna & Hamilton, 2001). In contrast, patients who misremember the 
risk as 5% rather than 2%, although inaccurate from a verbatim perspective, still understand 
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the essential gist that the surgery has some risk. (Table 1 describes how to identify the gist of 
decision options and assess gist comprehension.)
In decision-making situations, simple values or gist principles (e.g., it is good to avoid risk if 
possible) are applied to gist representations of the options to reach a judgment/decision. FTT 
views gist-based reasoning as intuitive and as occurring primarily at an unconscious level 
(e.g., Reyna, 2008; Reyna et al., 2011). Intuition involves knowing or understanding 
something without the need to analyze details about how or why we know it. For example, 
when asked if they would shoplift, most adults would say “No” automatically, without 
having to think about why they would not. Most adults know intuitively that shoplifting is 
wrong, without analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of shoplifting (Haidt, 2007; 
Haidt & Kesebir, 2008). Moreover, FTT makes an important distinction between the actions 
that people take that are guided by this type of intuitive, gist-based reasoning and those that 
are mindless or result from a failure of impulse control. From this perspective, people 
sometimes do things they know are wrong due to a failure of self-control mechanisms to 
inhibit impulsive behavior. Thus, intuition and impulsivity are distinct concepts in FTT.
People often engage in both verbatim and gist reasoning about the same information ─ and 
these two types of reasoning compete when they favor different options. However, given that 
gist representations capture the essential meaning of information, FTT predicts that the 
tendency to rely on gist rather than verbatim representations should increase with 
development from childhood to adulthood and from novice to expert, which has been 
observed (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). In non-health contexts, research has also 
confirmed that adults and individuals with specialized expertise tend to rely on the least 
precise memory representations needed when making judgments or decisions (e.g., Reyna, 
Chick et al., 2014), which is referred to as a fuzzy processing preference. Due to this fuzzy 
processing preference, gist reasoning often involves thinking about risk and risk reduction in 
categorical terms (e.g., Getting vaccinated could save my life; I could get HIV if I have 
unprotected sex). Since risking death (or becoming infected with HIV) is undesirable, FTT 
predicts that this type of gist-based reasoning will lead to the adoption of behaviors that 
reduce risk (e.g., vaccination) and the avoidance of behaviors that increase risk (e.g., unsafe 
sexual activity). In contrast, verbatim-based reasoning involves thinking about risk and risk 
reduction in more precise (e.g., numerical) terms.1 In many public health contexts, the 
probability of harm from engaging in a particular behavior is low for a single act (e.g., the 
risk of becoming infected by HIV through a single act of unsafe sex). Hence, FTT predicts 
that verbatim-based reasoning often promotes risk taking—a high-likelihood of benefit 
compensates for a low-likelihood of harm. Similarly, FTT predicts that verbatim-based 
reasoning often reduces the uptake of precautionary behaviors (e.g., adult vaccinations for 
conditions such as influenza, pneumonia, and shingles) because the certainty of incurring 
costs (e.g., time, money) can offset a low-likelihood of benefit (i.e., most people do not get 
sick even if they are not vaccinated).2
1When a person is faced with two or more options that have identical representations when reduced to categorical terms (e.g., two 
medications used to treat the same condition and having the same potential side effects with different probabilities), choosing one 
option may require using ordinal gist representations or even more precise verbatim representations (Reyna, 2012).
2The view of adaptive decision-making posited by FTT contrasts with expectancy-value approaches such as the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and heuristics-and-biases frameworks (Kahneman, 2011) that view deliberation about behavioral options and 
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Predictions Derived from Fuzzy-Trace Theory
In this paper, we critically review evidence to determine whether the following predictions 
derived from FTT have been supported by empirical research in the health domain:
1. People form distinct verbatim and gist mental representations when 
exposed to health-relevant information; two examples of this hypothesis 
are:
1a. The specificity of retrieval or eliciting cues in questions affects 
the types of representations retrieved from memory (less 
specific, but meaningful, cues elicit gist; more specific cues 
elicit verbatim representations), influencing people’s 
estimation of health risks and altering the relationship between 
risk perceptions and health behavior.
1b. Gist representations are retained in memory longer than 
verbatim representations.
2. The preference for gist-based reasoning over verbatim-based reasoning 
increases with development and the acquisition of expertise.
3. Compared to verbatim-based reasoning, gist-based reasoning is associated 
with: (a) improved judgment and decision making (as evaluated using an 
external criterion such as medical expertise), (b) increased adoption of 
behaviors recommended to reduce health risks, and (c) improved health 
outcomes.
4. Four sources of bias contribute to errors in gist-reasoning: knowledge 
deficits, conceptually incomplete or inaccurate gist representations, failure 
to retrieve relevant knowledge and values from memory when making 
judgments and decisions, and processing interference caused by 
overlapping classes (e.g., the probability of having breast cancer, the 
probability of having a positive mammogram).
5. Compared to traditional (e.g., facts education or expectancy-value) 
approaches, interventions designed to facilitate gist-based reasoning will 
result in: (a) improved judgment and decision-making (again, as evaluated 
using an external criterion such as medical expertise), (b) increased 
adoption of behaviors recommended to reduce health risks, and (c) 
improved health outcomes.
the likelihood of outcomes associated with each option as critical to advanced reasoning (see Fukukura, Ferguson, & Fujita, 2013). 
Unlike fast-and-frugal approaches, gist is not simply processing less information. Gist involves meaning--integrating dimensions of 
information to distill its essence--not just processing a few dimensions of information because they are "good enough" (Marewski & 
Gigerenzer, 2012). For example, a heuristic such as “trust your doctor” would not be viewed as a reasoning principle in FTT if it 
involves mindlessly following authority as opposed to understanding the gist of health information. The fast-and-frugal approach also 
assumes that heuristics are mental shortcuts that are used due to memory limitations, whereas research using FTT has demonstrated 
memory-judgment independence (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995).
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Method
Eligibility Criteria
Studies were eligible for inclusion if they: (1) were empirical; (2) examined any health-
related issue, with the exception of violent crime (e.g., intimate partner violence, child 
sexual abuse); and (3) reported findings relevant to FTT. Studies using only qualitative 
methods were excluded. Studies limited to children under the age of 13 were also excluded 
because the few studies involving children identified focused primarily on the veracity of 
children’s memory.
Search Strategy
PubMed, PsycInfo, and Web of Science were searched using the terms: fuzzy-trace theory 
OR gist NOT gastrointestinal tumor. The search was limited to papers published between 
database inception and December 22, 2014.3 A citation search was also conducted using 
Web of Science to identify articles that referenced papers on the topic written by the 
developers of the theory (VF Reyna and CJ Brainerd). Finally, reference lists of all included 
studies were reviewed to identify additional eligible studies.
Study Selection and Data Extraction
One reviewer screened all titles and abstracts of the records retrieved via the electronic 
searches to identify potentially eligible studies. Full-text articles were reviewed to determine 
eligibility based on the criteria specified above. Data from each study were extracted by the 
primary reviewer onto a data collection form developed specifically for this purpose. Data 
abstracted included: participant characteristics, sample size, study design, and methods, 
outcome variables, and primary findings relevant to the theoretical predictions being 
evaluated.
Results
As shown in Figure 1 (see Appendix), a total of 5,958 unique records were retrieved via the 
electronic database searches. Seventy-one of these met study inclusion criteria. One 
additional paper was identified from searching the references of included papers, bringing 
the total number of included papers to 72. These papers reported the results of a total of 79 
studies, of which 42 were relevant to the specific predictions being evaluated. Tables 2 and 3 
summarize methods and findings from these 42 studies (see Appendix).
Effects of Cues on the Retrieval of Gist Versus Verbatim Memory Representations
Eight studies reported findings relevant to the prediction that the specificity of retrieval/
eliciting cues in questions affects the types of representations retrieved from memory 
(Baghal, 2011; Bigman, 2014; Brown & Morley, 2007; Brown, Nowlan, Taylor, & Morley, 
2013; Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008; Reyna et al., 2011). Two of these studies focused on 
adolescent sexuality (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna et al., 2011). The questions designed to cue 
3The search was updated on March 12, 2016. Information concerning 15 studies published between December 2014 and March 2016 
is provided in supplemental materials available online.
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retrieval of verbatim representations asked participants about their likelihood of 
experiencing several specific outcomes (e.g., getting pregnant or making someone pregnant 
within the next six months) and their chances on a precise 0–100 scale of currently having a 
sexually transmitted disease (STD). Applying FTT’s models of recognition memory, the 
investigators hypothesized that, because these risk-perception questions are precise, they are 
more likely to cue true memories of past behaviors, which then are used to estimate risk 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Thus, 
because responses reflect the riskiness of past behaviors, higher scores should be associated 
with a higher likelihood of being sexually active and intending to have sex. In contrast, to 
assess gist representations, the investigators used questions designed to cue global risk 
perceptions that could be answered without recall of verbatim information. These included: 
categorical risk perceptions (e.g., It only takes ONCE to get pregnant), gist principles (e.g., 
Better safe than sorry), and a global estimate of the risks associated with having sex (low, 
medium, or high). The investigators expected these measures to capture differences between 
thinking about risk in gist terms (e.g., categorically avoid lethal risks) and thinking about 
risk in verbatim (e.g., quantitative) terms (accept risks when potential benefits are 
sufficiently large ─ i.e., trade off risks and benefits). Therefore, they hypothesized that 
higher scores on the gist measures would be associated with a lower likelihood of being 
sexually active and intending to have sex, just the opposite pattern predicted for the verbatim 
measures. All of these hypotheses were confirmed in both studies: the verbatim measures 
were positively associated with risk taking and the gist measures were negatively associated 
with risk taking.
Two other studies examined young adults’ perceptions concerning risks associated with 
alcohol consumption (Brown & Morley, 2007; Brown et al., 2013). These studies also used 
different measures to cue retrieval of gist versus verbatim memory representations. In both 
studies, participants rated the probability that they would experience specific alcohol-related 
problems on a visual analogue scale with endpoints labeled “no chance” and “completely 
certain.” However, one set of instructions directed participants to place a single mark on the 
line to estimate this probability (i.e., a unitary point estimate). The other set of instructions 
asked participants to place two marks on the line to define the fuzzy boundaries of the 
estimate, that is, the area likely to include the true probability. This bounded risk estimate 
(less precise than the unitary estimate) was designed to be more likely to cue retrieval of 
vague gist representations. In both studies, the investigators hypothesized that respondents 
would be more motivated to underestimate their alcohol problems with point estimates, but 
the fuzziness of bounded estimates would allow such problems to be less obvious. Thus, 
they hypothesized that the bounded estimates would be less affected by the self-
enhancement bias often observed in point estimates of personal risk (i.e., viewing oneself as 
at lower risk of experiencing adverse health outcomes compared to similar others). This 
hypothesis was supported in both studies.
The unitary versus bounded risk estimates also changed in predicted ways in response to 
experimental manipulations. For example, unitary risk estimates were lower when made 
before bounded estimates, whereas bounded estimates were not affected by question order 
(Brown & Morley, 2007). In addition, unitary estimates were higher in the presence of an 
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accountability manipulation designed to reduce self-enhancement, whereas bounded 
estimates were not affected by this manipulation (Brown et al., 2013).
Another study used two methods to assess perceived risk of smoking (Baghal, 2011). One 
method cued retrieval of verbatim representations by asking participants to estimate the 
absolute risk of dying from lung cancer among (1) smokers and (2) non-smokers (i.e., 0% to 
100%). Participants’ responses to these questions were also used to derive measures of 
perceived relative risk and absolute risk difference. (Note that unlike the other studies 
described in this section, the verbatim risk measure did not ask participants to estimate their 
personal risk of experiencing the outcome. Therefore, one would not expect it to cue 
retrieval of true memories of risk-relevant behaviors, which is the basis for predicting a 
positive association between perceived risk and risk taking.) The second method asked 
participants to provide a fuzzier estimate of the risk of smoking by answering the question: 
“In your opinion, would smoking everyday be very risky for your health, somewhat risky, a 
little risky or not at all risky for your health?” (p. 355). Estimates made using both methods 
predicted current smoking status, with greater perceived risk associated with a lower 
likelihood of smoking (i.e., greater risk avoidance). Consistent with FTT, estimates made on 
the fuzzier, ordinal scale produced stronger relationships, despite the measurement 
advantage of more points on the numerical scale. In addition, consistent with the FTT 
prediction that reliance on gist-based reasoning increases with development, estimates made 
on the fuzzier scale predicted smoking status better among adults than adolescents.
In summary, findings from these studies support the FTT prediction that the specificity of 
retrieval cues in questions can affect the types of representations retrieved from memory. 
The ability of investigators to differentially cue retrieval of verbatim versus gist 
representations in predictable ways suggests that they are distinct with different 
psychological properties.
Retention of Gist Versus Verbatim Memory Representations
Three studies reported findings relevant to the prediction that gist representations are 
retained in memory longer than verbatim representations (Gaissmaier et al., 2012; Ruiz et 
al., 2013; Witteman & Tollenaar, 2012). Two of these studies assessed verbatim and gist 
memory of information contained in experimental stimulus materials (Gaissmaier et al., 
2012; Ruiz et al., 2013). The experimental materials in the study by Gaissmaier et al. (2012) 
conveyed information concerning (1) medications risks/benefits and (2) the risk of smoking 
using different types of graphic and numerical formats. In the study by Ruiz et al. (2013), 
the experimental materials conveyed personal cardiovascular risk information using different 
formats (e.g., frequencies, percentages). In both studies, memory was assessed while 
viewing the materials, 15 to 30 minutes later following a distractor task, and two to three 
weeks later. Both studies observed a rapid decline in verbatim memory during the 15–30 
minute period following information exposure. However, gist memory remained relatively 
high even at the two to three week follow-up. Another study compared the memory of 
mental health clinicians for detailed versus abstract (gist-like)4 information contained in 
4We use the terms verbatim-like and gist-like to differentiate between measures more likely to reflect verbatim and gist memory 
representations, respectively.
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vignettes describing hypothetical patients with symptoms of specific psychological disorders 
(Witteman & Tollenaar, 2012). Memory was assessed: (1) immediately after reading the 
vignettes and (2) one week later. Consistent with the other studies, they found that memory 
for detailed information (e.g., precise diagnosis) was lower when assessed one week after 
information exposure, but that memory for gist (e.g., global description of the type of 
problem, such as a problem in parent-child interactions) was higher when assessed after the 
one week delay. Thus, findings from all three studies support the prediction that gist 
representations are retained in memory longer than verbatim representations (dozens of lab 
studies support this prediction). This result is important because it suggests that individuals’ 
behavior is more likely to be influenced by the gist representations that are formed in 
response to exposure to health-relevant information (because they are retained longer and 
accessed more easily) than the verbatim representations (which tend to dissipate quickly 
over time).
Fuzzy Processing Preference
Five papers reported the results of eight studies relevant to the prediction that the preference 
for gist-based reasoning over verbatim-based reasoning increases with development and the 
acquisition of specialized expertise (Evans, Georgian-Smith, Tambouret, Birdwell, & Wolfe, 
2013; Feenstra, Ruiter, & Kok, 2011; Krupinski, Graham, & Weinstein, 2013, Reyna & 
Lloyd, 2006; Witteman & Tollenaar, 2012). Consistent with FTT, Reyna and Lloyd (2006) 
found that, when evaluating scenarios that described hypothetical patients at different levels 
of cardiac risk, more experienced physicians processed information more globally (i.e., 
ignored information not relevant to the decision at hand) than less experienced physicians, 
making sharper all-or-none distinctions among patients at different levels of risk (i.e., either 
discharging patients from the emergency department or admitting patients to the intensive 
care unit rather than “hedging their bets” by admitting patient to an unmonitored hospital 
bed). In two other studies, Witteman and Tollenaar (2012) examined memory differences 
among psychologists with different levels of clinical experience. Participants read vignettes 
describing hypothetical patients with symptoms of specific psychological disorders. As 
predicted by FTT, more experienced psychologists tended to remember more abstract (i.e., 
general description of the type of problem), but less detailed, information (i.e., precise 
diagnosis) from the vignettes than those with less experience.
Another group of investigators conducted three separate studies examining the ability of 
experts and non-experts to identify the presence of abnormality in images obtained from 
diagnostic tests (e.g., mammograms) (Evans et al., 2013). These studies showed that experts, 
but not non-experts, were able to detect the presence of abnormality in an image even when 
the image was viewed for as little as 250 milliseconds ─ the blink of an eye. Nonetheless, 
when the experts were asked to identify the precise area of abnormality within the image, 
their performance fell to the level of chance. Thus, consistent with FTT, the experts appeared 
to be processing the visual information in the images globally and intuitively, able to sense 
when something in an image was wrong, without being able to articulate the cause for their 
concern.
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Another study involving the interpretation of laboratory tests found that pathology residents 
processed breast biopsy images more globally as they gained experience, taking less time to 
identify (and focus on) the most relevant areas and ignoring irrelevant areas in the images 
(Krupinski et al., 2013). Finally, Feenstra et al. (2011) compared the time it took adolescent 
boys versus adult men to determine whether specific behaviors associated with highway 
safety (e.g., Being drunk behind the wheel) were good or bad ideas. Again, consistent with 
FTT, adults responded to questions more quickly than adolescents, suggesting the use of 
more gist-like, intuitive reasoning, rather than verbatim reasoning which would require a 
more time-consuming consideration of the possible outcomes that could result from 
engaging in the behavior.
In summary, the studies reviewed support the FTT prediction that the preference for gist-
based reasoning increases with development and the acquisition of specialized expertise. 
The consistency of these findings across a range of health issues and methodological 
approaches suggests that they are robust and not methodological artifacts.
Predicted Associations Between Gist-Based Reasoning and Improved Judgment, Decision 
Making, Behavior, and Health Outcomes
Clinical decision making—Five studies examined issues involving clinician decision 
making. Three of these studies (Evans et al., 2013; Krupinski et al., 2013; Reyna & Lloyd, 
2006) found that greater clinical experience was associated with greater reliance on global, 
gist-based processing and improved judgment and decision making. Only one study found 
that gist-based processing might have a detrimental effect on judgment/decision making. In 
that study (Witteman & Tollenaar, 2012), when a week elapsed between reading clinical 
vignettes describing hypothetical patients with symptoms of specific psychological disorders 
and providing diagnoses for the patients, more experienced psychologists, who remembered 
more of the gist but fewer of the details contained in the vignettes, made judgments that 
were judged as less accurate than those made by students with little experience. Most of the 
errors made by the experienced psychologists were gist-like in nature. That is, they were 
consistent with the gist of the information contained in the vignettes, but did not correspond 
to a precise DSM diagnostic classification. It remains unclear whether the types of errors 
made by the experienced clinicians would affect the appropriateness or quality of care 
delivered to patients. This is an important issue to address in future research.
Finally, Norman et al. (2014) hypothesized that encouraging second-year medical residents 
to work carefully and consider all the data presented (cuing deliberative, verbatim reasoning) 
when making diagnoses for 20 hypothetical clinical vignettes would reduce their error rate 
compared to encouraging them to work as quickly as possible without making errors (cuing 
more gist-like reasoning). Overall accuracy was about 45% in both conditions. Because 
residents may have lacked the knowledge needed to support gist-based reasoning, additional 
insight could be gained by replicating the study with a sample of more experienced 
physicians.
High risk behaviors—Six studies focused on risky behaviors (i.e., adolescent sexuality, 
drinking, smoking, speeding). In this context, FTT predicts that gist-based reasoning often 
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will be associated with risk avoidance and verbatim-based or more precise reasoning will be 
associated with risk taking. All of these studies found some support for this prediction. 
However, there were some mixed findings as well. Consistent with the prediction, both Mills 
et al. (2008) and Reyna et al. (2011) found that measures designed to cue retrieval of gist 
representations relevant to adolescent sexuality were associated with greater risk avoidance, 
whereas measures designed to cue retrieval of verbatim representations were associated with 
greater risk taking. Moreover, Mills and colleagues also asked participants whether they 
endorsed two gist principles: No risk is better than some risk and Less risk is better than 
more risk. The first principle reflects categorical gist reasoning, but the second principle 
reflects more precise ordinal gist reasoning. Participants were less likely to be sexually 
active if they endorsed only the categorical principle than if they endorsed only the ordinal 
principle, 30% versus 61%, respectively, supporting the FTT prediction that gist reasoning, 
particularly reasoning at the least precise level, increases the likelihood of behaving in ways 
that avoid unnecessary risks; this effect was replicated by Reyna et al. (2011). Similarly, 
Reyna et al. (2013) found that first-year college students who endorsed the categorical gist 
principle: “I have a responsibility to myself to wait until I am legal to drink” were less likely 
to (1) drink and (2) be harmed (e.g., experience an injury) as a result of drinking. Finally, 
Baghal (2008) demonstrated that participants who rated smoking as riskier on an ordinal 
(gist-like) scale were less likely to smoke (i.e., avoided risk) and that this measure predicted 
smoking status better than a numerical (verbatim-like) measure of perceived risk.
Brown et al. (2013) found only mixed support for the prediction that gist-based reasoning 
increases risk avoidance. Consistent with FTT, they found that higher scores on a bounded 
estimate of perceived risk of drinking (designed to capture gist representations) was 
associated with greater intention to reduce drinking, whereas higher scores on a unitary 
estimate (designed to capture verbatim representations) was not associated with intention. 
However, they also found that higher scores on both measures were associated with higher 
scores on a measure of problem drinking, although FTT predicts that higher scores on a gist 
(i.e., bounded) measure of risk perception should be associated with lower scores on the 
problem drinking measure. The difference in this finding from those reported in the earlier 
studies by Mills et al. (2008) and Reyna et al. (2011) is likely due to differences in how the 
gist risk representations were measured. In the earlier studies, the gist measures were 
intentionally constructed to be general and to avoid cuing memories of past risk-relevant 
behaviors. In contrast, the bounded estimates used by Brown and colleagues, which required 
participants to place two marks on a line to define the area likely to include their true 
probability of experiencing adverse outcomes due to drinking (although fuzzier than the 
unitary point estimates) were still relatively precise numerical estimates (not categories or 
ranks). Hence, bounded numerical estimates could cue memories of past risk-relevant 
behavior ─ perhaps creating the observed positive association.
In the final study focused on a risky behavior, Brown and Gould (2012) found that people 
who endorsed the gist principle, Speeding feels unsafe, prior to a media-based anti-speeding 
campaign, were less likely to report speeding after the campaign. However, people who 
endorsed the gist principle, Speeding is OK on long straight roads, prior to the campaign, 
were more likely to report speeding after the campaign. Although the second finding does 
not support the prediction that gist reasoning increases risk avoidance, the gist principle, 
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Speeding is OK on long straight roads, may differentiate people who think about speeding in 
categorical gist terms (e.g., safe versus unsafe) from those who think of it in more qualified 
(more precise) terms, distinguishing degrees of risk depending on the kinds of roads. This 
finding exemplifies the care that needs to be taken in clarifying theoretical concepts and in 
constructing measures that clearly differentiate between levels of gist (e.g., categorical vs. 
ordinal) and verbatim reasoning.
Patient decision making—Two studies examined issues involving patient decision 
making. Both found support for the FTT prediction that gist reasoning is associated with 
improved decision making and adoption of behaviors to reduce health risks. Using a 
hypothetical scenario that described two medications that reduce the need for cardiac bypass 
surgery, Hawley et al. (2008) found that gist understanding, assessed by two questions 
asking participants which of the two medications was more effective/safer, was a better 
predictor of choosing the medically superior medication than verbatim knowledge (e.g., 
probability of experiencing a particular side effect). In the other study, Smith et al. (2014) 
found that better gist understanding, operationalized as participant awareness of the 
possibility of having a false positive/negative test result, was associated with an increased 
likelihood of participating in colorectal cancer screening.
Eating disorders—The final study (Lang, Lopez, Stahl, Tchanturia, & Treasure, 2014) 
was a systematic review and meta-analysis of data from 12 observational studies to 
determine if a bias toward more local (detailed) over gist processing (i.e., weak central 
coherence5; see Reyna & Brainerd, 2011) might contribute to the development of eating 
disorders (e.g., anorexia). The meta-analysis found that individuals with eating disorders 
displayed superior local processing, but poorer global processing, compared to individuals 
without such disorders. These findings are consistent with the prediction that gist processing 
is associated with healthier functioning under many circumstances.
In summary, the studies reviewed provide support for the prediction that, compared to 
verbatim reasoning, gist reasoning is associated with improved judgment and decision 
making, increased adoption of behaviors recommended to reduce health risks, and improved 
health outcomes. However, the correlational nature of most research in this section makes it 
impossible to infer causality. Future studies should use multiple measurement strategies to 
assess gist and verbatim reasoning as well as mathematical models of underlying processes, 
including investigating bounded risk estimates, gist principles (differentiating categorical vs. 
ordinal gist principles), and categorical risk perceptions. Research is needed to better 
understand the extent to which different measurement approaches tap the same latent 
concepts. More experiments on health that manipulate gist versus verbatim reasoning are 
also needed.
Sources of Bias in Gist-Reasoning
Three studies reported findings examining at least one of the four predicted sources of error 
in gist reasoning (Adam & Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Adam, 2003; Wolfe, Fisher, & Reyna, 
5Weak central coherence is a cognitive style involving a bias towards processing detailed information at the expense of global 
integration or gist processing.
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2013). Two of these studies examined health care professionals’ estimates of teenagers’ risk 
for acquiring a sexually transmitted infection (STI). Both studies used a questionnaire 
specifically designed to disentangle the four different sources of error predicted by FTT 
(Reyna & Adam, 2003; Adam & Reyna, 2005). The sample in one study was limited to 
health educators with specialized training in STI risk (Adam & Reyna, 2005). The sample in 
the other study included physicians, other health care providers, and medical and graduate 
students in public health (Reyna & Adam, 2003). To begin, the investigators hypothesized 
that knowledge deficits would result in mis-estimation of some STI risks (e.g., females have 
greater biological susceptibility to infection than males) such that individuals with more 
advanced training specific to STIs (e.g., sexual risk health educators) would be more 
accurate; this was observed. To assess the effect of conceptually incomplete gist 
representations, the investigators hypothesized that individuals would overestimate the 
effectiveness of condoms in reducing the risk of HPV transmission. This hypothesis was 
confirmed in both studies. Although most respondents probably knew that HPV is spread via 
skin-to-skin contact, the gist representation of STIs is the “typical” fluid transmission that is 
blocked with condoms. Because condoms do not cover all areas that may be infected by 
HPV, however, they provide less protection against HPV transmission.
To assess the effect of errors caused by failure to retrieve relevant information from memory 
when making judgments/decisions, the investigators manipulated retrieval by asking some 
risk estimation questions in two formats, a format that “unpacked” the STI category (listing 
infection types, thereby facilitating retrieval) and a global format that did not provide 
specific cues. As predicted by FTT’s retrieval models (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, 2011), 
participants in both studies provided higher, and more accurate, numerical risk estimates 
when the question provided more retrieval cues.
Finally, to assess the effect of errors caused by processing interference due to overlapping 
classes (e.g., having or not having a disease, testing positive or negative for the disease), the 
investigators gave respondents information concerning the prevalence of a disease in the 
general population (e.g., 10%) and the sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test (e.g., 
80%). They then asked respondents to choose the probability that a person who tested 
positive for the disease did in fact have the disease from the options of 30% or 70%. 
Although this question provided all the information needed to answer correctly, over two-
thirds of participants in both studies indicated that the probability of disease given a positive 
test result was 70%, rather than the true value of just under 30%. These findings confirm the 
prediction that processing interference caused by overlapping classes can lead to errors in 
reasoning, even among individuals with advanced expertise. Similar findings were observed 
in another study that required participants to estimate the risk of various outcomes that 
required combining information about (1) the probability of having a genetic mutation that 
increased the risk of breast cancer (BRCA) and (2) the probability of developing BRCA 
(Wolfe et al., 2013). (For detailed processing assumptions, including the role of gist, see 
Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).
Together, findings from these studies support the FTT prediction that errors in gist reasoning 
can arise from the four sources identified. It follows that interventions designed to reduce or 
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eliminate these sources of bias will have beneficial effects on health behavior and decision 
making. We review evidence concerning this prediction in the next section.
Effectiveness of Interventions Designed to Facilitate Gist-Based Reasoning
As shown in Table 3, 15 studies examined the effectiveness of interventions designed to 
facilitate gist-based reasoning. The types of interventions evaluated are quite diverse.
Cognition and social adjustment—In a randomized controlled trial, Hogarty et al. 
(2004) compared the effects of cognitive enhancement therapy (CET) on cognition and 
behavior to state-of-the-art enriched supportive therapy in a sample of symptomatically 
stable patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. As the authors described, CET 
“attempts to facilitate the attainment of adult social cognitive milestones, such as perspective 
taking and social context appraisal, by shifting an alleged early developmental reliance on 
effortful, serial, and verbatim (concrete) cognitive processing to a more “gistful,” 
spontaneous abstraction of social themes through structured but unrehearsed in vivo social 
interactions” (p. 868). Positive effects of CET on measures of neurocognition and processing 
speed were evident after 12 months of treatment. At the end of the 24-month treatment 
program, positive effects were also observed on measures of cognitive style, social 
cognition, and social adjustment. Most of the positive effects observed were sustained one 
year after treatment ended (Hogarty, Greenwald, & Eack, 2006).
Gist reasoning—Four other studies (three using experimental designs) evaluated the 
effects of a gist reasoning intervention developed to train people how to develop a deeper 
understanding of complex information by abstracting gist meanings. As described by the 
investigators, “Skills addressed included higher-level cognitive strategies such as eliminating 
unimportant information (i.e., strategic attention), abstracting information in one’s own 
words (i.e., integrated reasoning), generating multiple interpretations and perspectives (i.e., 
elaborated reasoning), coming up with the personally applicable ‘take-home’ messages, and 
applying new learning to create novel individually relevant ideas (i.e., innovation)” (Cook, 
Chapman, Elliott, Evenson, & Vinton, 2014, p.4). This program demonstrated positive 
effects on gist reasoning among: adults with traumatic brain injury (Vas, Chapman, Cook, 
Elliott, & Keebler, 2011), adolescents with traumatic brain injury (Cook et al., 2014), and 
cognitively normal older adults (Anand, Chapman, Rackley, Keebler, Zientz, & Hart, 2011; 
Chapman et al., 2015). Chapman et al. (2015) also found beneficial effects of treatment on 
cerebral blood flow and functional connectivity in the default mode and central executive 
networks. Each of these studies used very small samples, however, ranging from 20 to 37. 
Therefore, more research is needed to assess the generalizability of the promising findings.
Decision-making and behavior—In a randomized controlled trial (N=734), Reyna and 
Mills (2014) used FTT to create a “gist-enhanced” version of an existing sexual education 
program, Reducing the Risk (RTR; Hubbard, Giese, & Rainey, 1998; Kirby, Barth, Leland, 
& Fetro, 1991). The “gist-enhanced” version of the program (RTR+) covered the same 
topics included in the original program, but also included activities that emphasized framing 
sexual decisions in categorical ways (e.g., even small risks add up over time). This was 
accomplished by promoting: extraction of the bottom-line gist associated with each class 
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activity, automatic retrieval of relevant values and reasoning principles, and automatic 
application of values and reasoning principles to gist representations. The RTR+ curriculum 
produced positive effects on 17 of the 26 outcomes examined relative to a control group that 
received communication skills training unrelated to sexual health. For nine of the outcomes, 
effects in the RTR+ group were also significantly greater than those observed in a group that 
received training using the original RTR curriculum. Perhaps most important, at the end of 
the 12-month follow-up period, 9.5% of participants in the RTR+ group reported having 
initiated sexual activity since baseline, compared to 18.9% and 15.9% in the communication 
skills and RTR groups, respectively.
FTT was also used to augment standard approaches in two randomized controlled trials 
evaluating an intelligent tutoring system, BRCA Gist, designed to educate users about breast 
cancer and genetic risk for this condition (Wolfe et al., 2015). The BRCA Gist tutor 
emphasizes the formation of gist representations that are consistent with the bottom-line 
meaning of the information presented, rather than memorization of verbatim information. 
For example, the program emphasizes that only women with a strong family history of 
breast cancer are good candidates for genetic screening and that most women who develop 
breast cancer do not have relevant genetic mutations. Thus, the developers of the BRCA Gist 
tutor hypothesized that it would enable users to: better discriminate among women at 
different levels of genetic breast cancer risk (low, medium, high); make more appropriate 
testing recommendations for women at different levels of risk; and decrease personal interest 
in genetic testing, since few women are at high risk for genetic susceptibility to breast 
cancer. Both studies found that the BRCA Gist tutor produced greater improvements in 
breast cancer knowledge relative to two control groups ─ one that reviewed breast cancer 
materials available on the NCI website and one that completed an unrelated nutrition 
tutorial. The BRCA Gist group also exhibited better gist comprehension than either control 
group. On the remaining outcomes, the BRCA Gist group consistently outperformed the 
Nutrition Tutorial control group and often outperformed the NCI website control group. 
However, differences between the BRCA Gist and NCI groups were not always significant 
on all measures across studies (see Fisher et al., 2013; Wolfe et al., 2015).
Patient and clinical decision-making—Three studies evaluated medical decision aids. 
First, Fraenkel et al. (2012) used FTT to develop a web-based, decision support tool to 
inform patients with rheumatoid arthritis about the risks and benefits of biologic therapy. 
The tool promoted accurate gist representations by emphasizing qualitative contrasts 
concerning treatment risks and benefits, and aligning information to simple values (i.e., gist 
principles). Using a pretest-posttest design, the investigators found that the tool increased 
knowledge, value clarity, willingness to take a biologic, and the percentage of patients 
making value-concordant decisions, which increased from 35% to 64%. Second, Smith et al. 
(2015) used a randomized controlled trial design to evaluate the effectiveness of a 3-page 
leaflet, The Gist, designed to inform the public about colorectal cancer. The Gist leaflet 
emphasized the bottom-line gist that screening is an effective way to reduce colorectal 
cancer risk, but did not include persuasive messages encouraging screening. Compared to a 
control group who received a 15-page booklet about colorectal cancer used by the English 
National Health Service Bowel Cancer Screening Program, those who also received The 
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Gist leaflet were more likely to exhibit adequate knowledge. The two groups did not differ 
on a measure of behavioral intention, however. Third, Lloyd and Reyna (2001) found that a 
web-based tool designed using FTT reduced information processing errors caused by 
overlapping classes (i.e., the probability of testing negative for a disease, the probability of 
having the disease) when used by medical students and residents to estimate the post-test 
probability of disease given a negative test result.
Physical and mental performance and weight loss—Last, three experimental 
studies examined the hypothesis that providing individuals with vague, rather than precise, 
information about themselves (e.g., describing the amount of a performance enhancing 
substance consumed as falling somewhere within a range, rather than providing the exact 
amount consumed) would result in improved performance, including behavioral change 
(Mishra, Mishra, & Shiv, 2011). This hypothesis was based on the assumption that vague 
information allows people to form self-enhancing gist representations (e.g., representations 
of the information that reflect the most favorable interpretation of a person’s potential to 
reach a goal) and that these self-enhancing representations can boost subsequent 
performance. The hypothesis was confirmed in all three experiments. Individuals who 
received vague information about their abilities and potential performed better on tests of 
mental acuity and physical strength and attained a more desirable weight. The investigators 
also demonstrated that the relative advantage provided by vague information disappeared in 
the presence of an accuracy prime designed to make it difficult for participants to distort the 
vague information in a self-enhancing manner. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, these 
results are “in praise of vagueness” as a tool for behavior change, per the title of the article.
Summary—The findings reported above support FTT’s prediction that, compared to 
traditional intervention approaches, interventions designed to facilitate gist-based reasoning 
will often result in: better decision-making, increased adoption of behaviors recommended 
to reduce health risks, and improved health outcomes. Most of the studies used randomized 
controlled trial designs. Although the samples in some of the studies were small, the 
consistency of findings across studies examining diverse health issues and using different 
intervention strategies to facilitate gist-based reasoning add credence to the robustness of the 
findings reported.
Other Studies
The remaining 37 studies did not report findings relevant to the specific predictions 
evaluated. Information concerning these studies is provided in supplementary materials 
online.
Discussion
This literature review supports the emergence of FTT as a generative theory in health 
behavior research in the sense that it has generated research about new and surprising ideas 
(e.g., that vagueness can have a salutary effect on health behaviors). The theory is also 
generative in the sense that it is predictive, having been spelled out in specific processing 
models that have begun to be tested in health contexts. Seventy-nine studies, over half 
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published since 2012, have used FTT, or central constructs from the theory, to better 
understand the determinants of health behaviors or to develop interventions that promote the 
adoption and maintenance of recommended behaviors. These studies span a wide variety of 
health conditions and populations, including adolescents and adults, as well as health care 
professionals. Forty-two of the studies addressed the specific predictions derived from FTT 
that were evaluated in this review. Findings from these studies provide considerable support 
for all of the predictions. Nevertheless, there are gaps, ambiguities, and some conflicting 
findings in this growing literature, as we discuss below.
First, as predicted, people appear to form distinct verbatim and gist mental representations 
when exposed to health-relevant information; for example, gist representations were retained 
in memory longer than verbatim representations. Moreover, the types of representations 
retrieved from memory could be manipulated by varying cues in questions and stimulus 
materials. Second, preference for gist-based reasoning over verbatim-based reasoning 
increased with development and the acquisition of expertise. Third, findings from most of 
the studies also supported the prediction that, compared to verbatim-based reasoning, gist-
based reasoning is associated with improved judgment and decision making, and increased 
adoption of behaviors recommended to reduce health risks. In addition, predicted sources of 
bias in gist reasoning (i.e., inadequate knowledge; incomplete gist representations; failure to 
retrieve relevant knowledge, representations, and values when making decisions; and 
processing interference caused by overlapping classes) were also observed. Thus, gist 
reasoning is not without perils. Finally, we found considerable support for the prediction 
that, compared to traditional intervention approaches, interventions designed to facilitate 
gist-based reasoning result in improved judgment and decision-making, increased adoption 
of behaviors recommended to reduce health risks, and improved health outcomes.
The observation that cues in questions and response options affect the memory 
representations retrieved when responding has important implications for the measurement 
of many constructs central to health psychology, including health beliefs and attitudes. As 
the specificity of the measure and precision of the response scale increases, respondents are 
more likely to retrieve relevant verbatim memories when providing a response. When 
answering more general (but meaningful) questions, however, respondents are more likely to 
retrieve gist representations; these verbatim/gist cuing effects are consistent with FTT’s 
recognition models (e.g., see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). As 
demonstrated in several studies reviewed, these differences in question format can alter the 
relationship between measures of risk perception and behavior (Baghal, 2011; Brown et al., 
2013; Mills et al., 2008; Reyna et al., 2011).
Although effects of question format were generally consistent with FTT’s predictions, 
expected reversals of correlations were not always found. Future research should 
systematically vary the precision of the cues (e.g., from exact numbers, ranges of numbers, 
ranks to categories) and assess the precision of the memories that are retrieved in response to 
these cues for a variety of health judgments (e.g., perceived diabetes risk, cardiovascular 
risk). Because all of the reviewed studies were conducted within the context of unhealthy 
risk taking, more research is needed to determine if the findings extend to measures of other 
types of risk perceptions (e.g., perceived susceptibility to illness) and to other constructs 
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included in traditional theories of health behavior (e.g., perceived benefits/barriers of 
adopting recommended precautions).
Further, although innovative methods have been developed to measure verbatim and gist 
representations as distinct constructs and to separate the effects of different sources of bias 
that affect risk judgments and interfere with reasoning, more explicit methods for measuring 
gist in the context of health psychology are needed. For example, measures of ideal or 
informed gist representations need to be distinguished from normative measures (i.e., what 
most patients who are not experts would extract as the gist of a health communication). 
More research is also needed to examine the effects of gist versus verbatim processing 
among older adults, the largest consumers of health-related products (Reyna & Brainerd, 
2011). In addition, specialized techniques used in basic science research can be applied to 
measure verbatim and gist representations relevant to health decisions (e.g., a set of 
procedures and models called “conjoint recognition,” which is not the same as conjoint 
analysis; see Reyna, 2012).
Effective gist reasoning requires being able to distill complex information to identify the 
essential bottom-line meaning. The medical laboratory studies by Evans et al. (2013) and 
Krupinski et al. (2013) also highlight the global (gist-like) information processing strategies 
that experts use when processing complex information ─ allowing them to sense that 
something in an image from a laboratory test is not quite right, without being able to identify 
the precise location of the abnormality. Although expertise is not an experimental 
manipulation, research on FTT has used experimental manipulations to mimic predicted 
effects of expertise (Reyna et al., 2014).
Similarly, effective gist reasoning in other areas requires that individuals have adequate 
knowledge to support health judgments and decisions (Reyna & Adam, 2003). However, 
knowledge of facts is not enough. Instead, teaching adolescents intuitive recognition of high-
risk situations and strategies to avoid risk is likely to reduce risky behavior (e.g., Reyna & 
Mills, 2014). Effective gist reasoning also requires that individuals: have fully developed gist 
representations (i.e., understand the bottom-line gist associated with major options); retrieve 
relevant values and reasoning principles from memory at the time decisions are being made; 
are able to process available information intuitively, with minimal interference from 
unnecessary, detailed verbatim information; and can inhibit impulsive choices (Reyna, 2008, 
2012).
These findings have important implications for the design of interventions to promote the 
adoption of behaviors to reduce health risks and improve individual and population health 
outcomes. FTT suggests that health interventions should emphasize the bottom-line gist of 
the information being conveyed. Doing this requires organizing the information and deciding 
what is important, not just shortening the message. The developer of the intervention must 
determine if there is consensus among clinical experts and experienced patients about the 
gist of the options, which, in practice, often occurs (Fraenkel et al., 2012). If consensus 
cannot be reached, the major alternative interpretations of the gist of the options must be 
presented. This guards against the introduction of bias and infringements on individual 
autonomy. Gistifying a health message means that some facts are cut entirely (because they 
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are trivial), others recede into the background as less important, facts are interpreted and 
connected with one another so that overarching patterns and high-level (macro or 
integrative) inferences are foregrounded, and the purpose of the message—its functional 
significance—drives this process and is transparent.
To the extent that different message and graphical formats have differential effects on 
verbatim knowledge versus gist understanding, those that favor gist understanding are likely 
to have the greatest impact on improving decision making. In addition, because knowledge, 
values, gist representations and reasoning principles that are stored in memory will not 
impact decision making unless they are retrieved when decisions are being made, FTT 
suggests that interventions should include retrieval cues and other strategies that promote 
automatic (i.e., without conscious deliberation) responding in high-risk situations. Role-
playing activities using common scenarios that differ in details may be helpful to achieve 
this goal of automatization (Reyna & Mills, 2014). Finally, when developing interventions, it 
is important to understand misconceptions that exist in the target population (e.g., only 
women get breast cancer) that may interfere with appropriate gist processing. Unless 
fundamental misconceptions are recognized and addressed, it is unlikely that individuals will 
be able to extract an accurate bottom-line gist.
In conclusion, by drawing on research on basic cognitive processes, FTT provides insights 
into how individuals make judgments and decisions that are supported by carefully 
controlled laboratory experiments. These insights seem to generalize to health decisions. 
FTT suggests a need for intervention approaches that facilitate intuitive, gist-based 
information processing. This review supports the development of such applications as a 
promising area for future research.
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Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Table 1
Guidelines for Identifying the Gist of Health Decisions and Assessing Gist Comprehension
Step Explanation
1. Differentiate between gist
and verbatim representations
of decision options.
The verbatim representation consists of the literal
details about the decision options, such as lists of
facts and figures. The most basic gist representation
of decision options captures the essential meaning or
bottom line of decision options. Multiple gist
representations are typically encoded at different
levels of precision, beginning with the most basic
level of categorical representations (e.g., Surgery has
some risk of death as opposed to no risk), and moving
to more differentiated levels of precision, such as
ordinal representations (e.g., Surgery has a lower risk
of death than not having surgery).
2. Elicit the essential meaning,
or bottom line, of decision
options from informants with
relevant expertise and
experience that provides
insight, usually clinical
experts and experienced
patients.
Gist is a simple, imprecise summary of the main
points of information, as defined in psycholinguistics
(e.g., Clark & Clark, 1977). Thus, gist involves
distinguishing details from the main points—what is
important for making a decision. Prescriptive gist—
what an informed decision maker would take to be the
gist—should be distinguished from psychologically
descriptive gist—what a decision maker with limited
experience, knowledge, or insight would take to be the
gist of the options.
Example: “The important thing is to make sure the
public understands that there is no substantial risk
from vaccines and that the benefits are very
significant” (Ben Carson, February 12, 2015, The
Florida Times-Union).
3. Determine whether there is
consensus among clinical
experts and experienced
patients about the gist of the
options, which, in practice,
often occurs (e.g., Fraenkel etal., 2012).
If consensus is not possible, identify major alternative
interpretations of the gist of the options; present each
of these to patients.
4. Verbatim representations can
be assessed through recall or
recognition tests for
resented information, or
through rote computation
(e.g., reading off a number
from a bar graph).
Passing verbatim tests does not establish
understanding because they can be passed by
retrieving memorized information. “Informed”
consent in current practice typically involves passing
tests of verbatim recognition (e.g., Lloyd et al., 2001).
5. In contrast, gist
representations should be
assessed by testing
comprehension, inference, or
transfer (i.e., extrapolating
beyond memorized
information to demonstrate
learned knowledge with
materials that differ
superficially from presented
information).
Understanding the basic gist of risk involves
distinguishing functionally significant categories:
Does a 2% risk of death from surgery involve no risk
or some risk, low risk or high risk?; Will death
probably happen or probably not happen?; Is death
certain or uncertain?
Example: “The marking scheme was designed to
capture whether participants had encoded gist
representations of the numbers such as whether the
numbers were increasing or decreasing (i.e.,
“screening reduces bowel cancer deaths”), or
whether the magnitude of the difference between
numbers is large or small (i.e., “screening only saves
a few lives”)” (p. 5, Smith et al., 2014).
According to FTT, informed consent requires passing
tests of qualitative comprehension, inference, or
transfer of basic gist.
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